US-Soviet sailors on VJ Day. Japanese syntax in comparative perspective pdf download Soviet entry into the war was a significant factor in the Japanese government’s decision to surrender unconditionally, as it made apparent the Soviet Union would no longer be willing to act as a third party in negotiating an end to hostilities on conditional terms. November 1943, Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan once Nazi Germany was defeated. Japanese surrender which if ignored would lead to their “prompt and utter destruction”.
Stalin that, if necessary, he could attack on the morning of August 5. The timing was well planned and enabled the Soviet Union to enter the Pacific Theater on the side of the Allies, as previously agreed, before the war’s end. August 9 the Soviet Government would consider itself to be at war with Japan. At one minute past midnight Trans-Baikal time on August 9, 1945, the Soviets commenced their invasion simultaneously on three fronts to the east, west and north of Manchuria. September 1931, Japan eventually gained control of Korea, Manchuria and Southern Sakhalin.
The Neutrality Pact freed up forces from the border incidents and enabled the Soviets to concentrate on their war with Germany, and the Japanese to concentrate on their southern expansion into Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Germany becoming increasingly certain, the Soviet attitude to Japan changed, both publicly, with Stalin making speeches denouncing Japan, and “privately”, with the Soviets building up forces and supplies in the Far East. Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan once Nazi Germany was defeated. Soviet leader also wanted to extract gains in the Far East as well as Europe. The only way Stalin could make Far Eastern gains without a two-front war would be for Germany to capitulate before Japan. Soviets made it policy to intern Allied aircrews who landed in Soviet territory following operations against Japan, although airmen held in the Soviet Union under such circumstances were usually allowed to “escape” after some period of time. Nevertheless, even before the defeat of Germany the Soviet buildup in the Far East steadily accelerated.
By early 1945 it had become apparent to the Japanese that the Soviets were preparing to invade Manchuria, though they were unlikely to attack prior to Germany’s defeat. In addition to their problems in the Pacific, the Japanese realised they needed to determine when and where a Soviet invasion would occur. Stalin secured from Roosevelt the promise of Stalin’s Far Eastern territorial desires, in return agreeing to enter the Pacific war within two or three months of the defeat of Germany. By the middle of March 1945, things were not going well in the Pacific for the Japanese, and they withdrew their elite troops from Manchuria to support actions in the Pacific. Meanwhile, the Soviets continued their Far Eastern buildup.
The Soviets had decided that they did not wish to renew the Neutrality Pact. The terms of the Neutrality Pact required that 12 months before its expiry, the Soviets must advise the Japanese of this, so on 5 April 1945 they informed the Japanese that they did not wish to renew the treaty. Soviets went to great efforts to assure the Japanese that the treaty would still be in force for another twelve months, and that the Japanese had nothing to worry about. Germany surrendered, meaning that if the Soviets were to honour the Yalta agreement, they would need to enter war with Japan by 9 August 1945.
The situation continued to deteriorate for the Japanese, and they were now the only Axis power left in the war. Since Yalta they had repeatedly approached, or tried to approach, the Soviets in order to extend the neutrality pact, and to enlist the Soviets in negotiating peace with the allies. One of the roles of the Cabinet of Admiral Baron Suzuki, which took office in April 1945, was to try to secure any peace terms short of unconditional surrender. Japan, providing them with specific proposals and in return they offered the Soviets very attractive territorial concessions. Stalin expressed interest, and the Japanese awaited the Soviet response.
The Soviets continued to avoid providing a response. 16 July to 2 August 1945. On 24 July the Soviet Union recalled all embassy staff and families from Japan. The Japanese continued to wait for the Soviet response, and avoided responding to the declaration. The Japanese had been monitoring Trans-Siberian Railway traffic and Soviet activity to the east of Manchuria and in conjunction with the Soviet delaying tactics, this suggested to them that the Soviets would not be ready to invade east Manchuria before the end of August. They did not, however, have any real idea, and no confirming evidence, as to when or where any invasion would occur. The Japanese were caught completely by surprise when the Soviets declared war an hour before midnight on 8 August 1945, and invaded simultaneously on three fronts just after midnight on 9 August.
Front instead of an army. 85,819 vehicles and 3,721 aircraft. Approximately one-third of its strength was in combat support and services. Manchuria, the occupation of which it had always opposed on strategic grounds. Additionally, by the time of the invasion, the few remnants of its fleet were stationed and tasked with the defense of the Japanese home island in the event of an invasion by American forces. On economic grounds, Manchuria was worth defending since it had the bulk of usable industry and raw materials outside Japan and was still under Japanese control in 1945.
Pacific front over the previous three years to contend with the advance of American and Allied forces. By 1945, the Kwantung Army contained a large number of raw recruits and conscripts, with generally obsolete, light, or otherwise limited equipment. As a result, it had essentially been reduced to a light infantry counter-insurgency force with limited mobility or ability to fight a conventional land war against a coordinated enemy. Solun and into the center of Manchuria.