This article has multiple issues. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. Exit, Loyalty in the workplace pdf, and Loyalty book cover. Exit and voice themselves represent a union between economic and political action.
Voice, on the other hand, is by nature political and at times confrontational. While both exit and voice can be used to measure a decline in an organization, voice is by nature more informative in that it also provides reasons for the decline. Exit, taken alone, only provides the warning sign of decline. The general principle, therefore, is that the greater the availability of exit, the less likely voice will be used. Loyal members become especially devoted to the organization’s success when their voice will be heard and that they can reform it. By understanding the relationship between exit and voice, and the interplay that loyalty has with these choices, organizations can craft the means to better address their members’ concerns and issues, and thereby effect improvement. Failure to understand these competing pressures can lead to organizational decline and possible failure.
Exit, Voice and Loyalty can be observed, reviewed and addressed as a matter of course, and in a learning organization, can result in reduced member “churn” and increased growth in member satisfaction, loyalty, referrals and growth. Some disagreement exists over whether “loyalty” is a condition that affects the “exit” and “voice” behavior, or if it is a behavior in itself. Hirschman’s assertion that greater exit and entry costs heighten the likelihood of voice. Those in the military are sometimes faced with things that they might not morally agree with.
They have a sense of “patriotic obligation” to their country, even if they feel the war they are fighting is “unjust. This patriotic obligation stems from their loyalty to their government and country. They feel that they need to do as they’re told in order to be a loyal citizen. A key application of Hirschman’s scheme of exit, voice and loyalty has been emigration. Hirschman modeled these options as mutually exclusive and postulated a seesaw mechanism: the easier available the exit option, the lower the likelihood of voice. For rulers, emigration served as a safety-valve, by which the discontent renounced on their possibility to articulate protest. Latin American powerholders have long encouraged their political enemies and potential critics to remove themselves from the scene through voluntary exile.