Reasoning processes require stable representations of constraints. There are two principal ways number sense as situated knowing in a conceptual domain pdf achieve stability in conceptual models.

First, the conceptual models that anthropologists call cultural models achieve representational stability via a combination of intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. Second, the association of conceptual structure with material structure can stabilize conceptual representations. This is an old and pervasive cognitive strategy. Conceptual blending theory provides a useful framework for considering the joint contributions and mutual constraints of mental and material structure.

Projecting material structure into a blended space can stabilize the conceptual blend. The term material anchor is meant to emphasize the stabilizing role of the material structure. In this article, I will present and discuss a number of examples of materially anchored blends, which depend to different degrees on material structure. Materially anchored blends vary on a number of complexly related dimensions, including the extent to which the blend relies on the presence of material structure in the perceptual field, the complexity of the material structure, and whether the material structure was designed to support the blend or is used opportunistically.

Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution. Professor of Cognitive Science at the University of California, San Diego. He earned a PhD in Cognitive Anthropology from the University of California, San Diego in 1978. In 1985, he was awarded a prestigious John D.

Professor Hutchins is known for his research on cognition in real-world settings. His study of the cognitive processes involved in ship navigation resulted in the publication of the book, Cognition in the Wild. Conceptual representations in long-term memory crucially contribute to perception and action, language and thought. However, the precise nature of these conceptual memory traces is discussed controversially. In particular, the grounding of concepts in the sensory and motor brain systems is the focus of a current debate.

Here, we review theoretical accounts of the structure and neural basis of conceptual memory and evaluate them in light of recent empirical evidence. A systematic review of behavioral and neuroimaging studies in healthy participants along with brain-damaged patients will then be used to evaluate the competing theoretical approaches to conceptual representations. These findings indicate that concepts are flexible, distributed representations comprised of modality-specific conceptual features. Conceptual features are stored in distinct sensory and motor brain areas depending on specific sensory and motor experiences during concept acquisition. Three important controversial issues are highlighted, which require further clarification in future research: the existence of an amodal conceptual representation in the anterior temporal lobe, the causal role of sensory and motor activation for conceptual processing and the grounding of abstract concepts in perception and action.

We argue that an embodiment view of conceptual representations realized as distributed sensory and motor cell assemblies that are complemented by supramodal integration brain circuits may serve as a theoretical framework to guide future research on concrete and abstract concepts. Connectivism: Learning theory of the future or vestige of the past? Siemens and Downes initially received increasing attention in the blogosphere in 2005 when they discussed their ideas concerning distributed knowledge. This has led to a number of questions in relation to existing learning theories.